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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Leroy S. Wilske appeals from his Judgment of Conviction and Sentence in a
2013 case where a jury found him guilty of felony operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol (DUI), misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, and
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, and from his Judgment on Probation
Violation and Disposition in a 2010 case where the district court revoked his probation
for felony DUI. On appeal, Mr. Wilske asserts that the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his motion to sever in the 2013 case, that the district court erred when it
denied his "motion for a partial directed verdict" in the 2013 case, and that the district
court erred when it found that he had violated his probation in the 2010 case.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In Kootenai County No. CR 2010-7770 (hereinafter, the 2010 case), the State
charged Mr. Wilske with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol,
felony, in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-8004 and 18-8005.

(R., pp.21-22, 44-46.)

Later, the district court amended the charges to include a Part II alleging that Mr. Wilske
had been previously convicted of a violation of I.C. § 18-8004 in Kootenai County and a
violation of a substantially similar foreign statute in Washington State. (R., pp.114-15.)
Mr. Wilske filed a motion to suppress, which the district court denied. (R., pp.3435, 104-13; see R., pp.36-43.) Mr. Wilske then entered a conditional plea of guilty to
the charge while reserving the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress.

(R., pp.122-23.)

The district court approved the conditional guilty plea.

(R., pp.124-25.) The district court then imposed a unified sentence of six years, with
three years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Mr. Wilske on supervised

1

probation for a period of three years. (R., pp.126-30, 1
and the Idaho

of Appeals, in Supreme Court

) Mr. Wilske appealed,
No. 38298,

denial of Mr. Wilske's motion to suppress in an unpublished opinion.

the

(R., pp.140-42,

158-66.)
Over a year later, Kootenai County Sheriff's deputies contacted Mr. Wilske after
seeing his car stopped on the side of the road. (Sealed Exs., p.99.) The deputies saw
an open beer car between Mr. Wilske's legs. (Sealed Exs., p.99.) Mr. Wilske told the
deputies he had pulled over so he could send text messages. (Sealed Exs., p.99.) He
reportedly had a strong odor of alcohol coming from his person and slurred speech, and
the deputies administered field sobriety tests, which he failed.
Mr. Wilske was then arrested.

(Sealed Exs., p.99.)

(Sealed Exs., p.99.)

Deputies found a baggie of

marijuana on Mr. Wilske's person, and found marijuana, a tobacco grinder containing a
green, leafy substance, and a glass pipe during an inventory of the car. (Sealed Exs.,
pp.99, 113.)
In Kootenai County No. CR 2013-4953 (hereinafter, the 2013 case), the State
filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Mr. Wilske had committed the crime of operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, felony, in violation of I.C. §§ 188004 and 18-8005. (R., pp.199-200.) The magistrate consolidated the 2013 case with
a related case where Mr. Wilske had allegedly committed the misdemeanor crimes of
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., p.207;
see R., p.208.)
The State then filed in the 2010 case a Motion to Show Cause Why Probation
Should Not Be Revoked, alleging that Mr. Wilske violated the terms and conditions of
his probation through being charged with felony DUI in the 2013 case. (R., pp.215-16.)
2

The district court subsequently issued an Order to Show Cause Why Probation Should
Not

Revoked And Suspended Sentence Imposed.

(R., pp.237-38.)

Mr. Wilske

denied the alleged probation violation. (R., p.239.)
At the preliminary hearing in the 2013 case, the magistrate found probable cause
and bound Mr. Wilske over to the district court.

(R., pp.245-50.) The State filed an

Information in the 2013 case charging Mr. Wilske with felony DUI, misdemeanor
possession of a controlled substance,
paraphernalia.

(R., pp.251-53.)

and

misdemeanor possession of drug

Mr. Wilske entered a not guilty plea to all three

charges. (R., pp.213-14, 239-40.)
The State then filed a Report of Probation Violation in the 2010 case, alleging
that Mr. Wilske had violated the terms and conditions of his probation through
committing the offense of felony DUI, committing the offense of possession of a
controlled substance, committing the offense of possession of drug paraphernalia,
possessing a controlled substance, and possessing drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.30506.) Later, the State filed an Addendum to the Report of Probation Violation, alleging
that Mr. Wilske had also violated his probation through consuming an alcoholic
beverage before his arrest for DUI and possessing an alcoholic beverage prior to his
arrest. (R., pp.319-20.)
In the 2013 case, Mr. Wilske filed a Motion to Sever the misdemeanor charges
from the felony DUI charge, on the grounds that "the felony charge is that of DUI and
there is no evidence of marijuana use or intoxication" and mentioning these issues to
the jury "would greatly and unfairly prejudice the Defendant."

(R., pp.292-93.) The

district court, after conducting a hearing, denied the motion to sever. (R., pp.315-18.)

3

The 2013 case proceeded to a jury trial. (R., pp.321-33.)

the

of the

case in chief during the trial, Mr. Wilske requested that the district court strike
the allegations from the felony DUI charge that he drove under the influence or drove
with a blood alcohol content (BAC) greater than 0.08, because there was no evidence
from which the jury could find him guilty of driving under the influence or with a BAC
greater than 0.08. (Tr., Nov. 8, 2013, p.406, Ls.10-24.) He also requested that the jury
admonished to disregard any evidence regarding his blood alcohol content, because
he was not charged as being in actual physical control of a vehicle with a BAC greater
than 0.08. (Tr., Nov. 8, 2013, p.407, Ls.4-13.) If the district court granted Mr. Wilske's
requests, the only issue left to the jury on the DUI charge would be whether the state
could prove that Mr. Wilske was in actual physical control of the vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol.

(Tr., Nov. 8, 2013, p.407, Ls.14-19.) The district court viewed

Mr. Wilske's requests "as a motion for at least a partial directed verdict on some of the
alternative theories of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence, 18-8004,"
and denied the motion.

(Tr., Nov. 8, 2013, p.409, L.15 - p.411, L.5.) The jury then

found Mr. Wilske guilty on all three counts in the 2013 case. (R., p.334.)
At the combined probation violation hearing for the 2010 case and sentencing
hearing for the 2013 case, Mr. Wilske admitted to violating his probation through
consuming an alcoholic beverage prior to his arrest for DUI and being in possession of
an alcoholic beverage prior to his arrest. (R., p.370; see R., p.319.) The district court
found he had violated his probation in the 2010 case through being found guilty of
felony DUI in the 2013 case, being found guilty of misdemeanor possession of a
controlled substance in the 2013 case, being found guilty of misdemeanor possession
of drug paraphernalia in the 2013 case, possessing a controlled substance, and
4

(R., p.370; Tr., Jan. 6, 2014, p.9, L.15

p.10, L.17; see

19.)
The State recommended that the district court, in the 2013 case, impose a
unified sentence of six years, with three years fixed, to run concurrently with the
executed sentence in the 2010 case. (See R., p.370; Tr., Jan. 6, 2014, p.14, L.21
p.15, L.3.)

Mr. Wilske recommended that the district court retain jurisdiction in both

cases, and recommend him for a CAPP "rider." (R., p.370; Tr., Jan. 6, 2014, p.17, L.6p.18, L.5.) Mr. Wilske's presentence investigator in the 2013 case had recommended
Mr. Wilske for retained jurisdiction and a CAPP rider. (Sealed Exs., p.110.)
In the 2010 case, the district court revoked probation, executed the sentence,
and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.380-82.) In the 2013 case, the district court imposed a
unified sentence of six years, with three years fixed, and also retained jurisdiction. 1
(R., pp.385-87.) The sentences would run concurrently. (R., pp.381, 386.) The Idaho
Department of Correction subsequently placed

Mr. Wilske on a CAPP rider.

(R., pp.396-97.) After Mr. Wilske completed the CAPP rider, the district court placed
him on supervised probation for a period of two years in both cases. (R., pp.404, 40814.)
Mr. Wilske filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the Judgment on Probation
Violation in the 2010 case (R., pp.376-77), and a timely Notice of Appeal from the

For the possession of a controlled substance count in the 2013 case, the district court
imposed a sentence of sixty days in jail. (R., p.383; Tr., Jan. 6, 2014, p.20, Ls.7-9.) For
the possession of drug paraphernalia count in the 2013 case, the district court imposed
a sentence of sixty days in jail. (R., p.384; Tr., Jan. 6, 2014, p.20, Ls.9-10.) All three
counts in the 2013 case would run concurrently with each other. (R., pp.383-84;
Tr., Jan. 6, 2014, p.20, Ls.10-15.)
1

5

of Conviction
Court consolidated

in the 2013 case (R.,
(R.,

6

The Idaho

ISSUES

1.

Did the district court abuse
sever in the 2013

2.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Wilske's "motion for a partial directed
verdict" in the 2013 case?

3.

Did the district court err when it found that Mr. Wilske had violated his probation
in the 2010 case?

discretion when it

7

Mr. Wilske's motion to

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Wilske's Motion To Sever
In The 2013 Case
A.

Introduction
Mr. Wilske asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his

motion to sever in the 2013 case, because the facts of his trial demonstrate that unfair
prejudice resulted from the joint trial and he was denied a fair trial. At Mr. Wilske's trial
a potential source of prejudice-the possibility that the jury may conclude that he was
guilty of one crime and then find him guilty of

other simply because of his

criminal disposition, i.e., Mr. VVilske is a bad person-appeared. That potential source
of prejudice appeared because evidence of the misdemeanor charges would not have
been admissible in a separate trial of the felony DUI charge, as it was not relevant to the
felony DUI.

B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
An appellate court reviews the denial of a motion to sever for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 564 (2007); see State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865,
867 (1983). When reviewing a trial court's discretionary decision, an appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry into (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion, (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer bounds of
such discretion and consistently with legal standards applicable to specific choices, and
(3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
Idaho Criminal Rule 14 provides that:
8

State v.

If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or of defendants in a complaint, indictment or information or by
such joinder for trial together, the court may order the state to elect
between counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide whatever
other relief justice requires.
I.C.R. 14. Rule 14 "presumes joinder was proper in the first place." Field, 144 Idaho at
564-65. "Rule 14 permits a trial court to sever defendants, or grant separate trials of
counts, if a party is prejudiced by an otherwise permissible joinder under Rule 8(a)."
State v. Anderson, 138 Idaho 359, 361 n.1 (Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis in original).

"When reviewing an order denying a motion to sever, the inquiry on appeal is
whether the defendant has presented facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice resulted
from a joint trial, which denied the defendant a fair trial." State v. Eguilior, 137 Idaho
903, 908 (Ct. App. 2002). The appellate court reviews the trial proceeding to determine
whether any of the below "potential sources of prejudice" appeared:
(a) the possibility that the jury may confuse and cumulate the evidence,
rather than keeping the evidence properly segregated; (b) the potential
that the defendant may be confounded in presenting defenses; and (c) the
possibility that the jury may conclude the defendant is guilty of one crime
and then find him or her guilty of the other simply because of his or her
criminal disposition, i.e., he or she is a bad person.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Abel, 140 Idaho at 867-68.

C.

Unfair Prejudice Resulted From The Joint Trial And Denied Mr. Wilske A Fair
Trial, Because The Possibility That The Jury May Conclude That He Was Guilty
Of The Misdemeanor Charges And Find Him Guilty Of Felony DUI Simply
Because Of His Criminal Disposition Appeared
Mr. Wilske asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his

motion to sever, because the facts of his trial demonstrate that unfair prejudice resulted
from the joint trial and denied him a fair trial.
The district court initially discussed whether joinder would have been proper
under Rule 8(a), which was not relevant to the issue of whether to sever the charges
9

under Rule 14. The district court recognized that the decision to sever charges is within
discretion, but also stated "that it's governed in part

rules 8 and 13 of the Idaho

Criminal Rules. Rule 8(a) being the rule that really analyzes whether joinder is proper."
(Tr., Nov. 1, 2013, p.9, L.23

p.10, L.4.) However, whether to sever charges is actually

governed by Rule 14, which "presumes joinder was proper in the first place." See Field,
144 Idaho at 564-65.

Further, "Rule 14 permits a trial court to sever defendants, or

grant separate trials of counts, if a party is prejudiced by an otheJWise permissible
joinder under Rule 8(a)." State v. Anderson, 138 Idaho 359, 361 n.1 (Ct. App. 2003)
(emphasis in original). Thus, the district court's discussion on whether joinder would
have been proper under Rule 8(a) (see Tr., Nov. 1, 2013, p.10, Ls.10-25), was not
relevant to the issue of whether to sever the charges under Rule 14.
Mr. Wilske asserted that the jury would be unfairly prejudiced against him
because "[t]he drug charges have nothing to do with the DUI charge. They have no
relevance whatsoever to the DUI charge. . . . [T]here's no evidence of [Mr. Wilske]
being under the influence of any controlled substance. So they have no applicability to
the DUI charge at all." (Tr., Nov. 1, 2013, p.6, L.23 - p.7, L.6.) The district court then
asked: "Is part of the concern that the jury will be confused as to whether the allegation
is that Mr. Wilske is under the influence of alcohol and/or marijuana or just that there
would be confusion that, Gee, if he's a drug possessor, he's probably a DUler as well?"
(Tr., Nov.1, 2013, p.7, Ls.15-20.) Mr. Wilske replied, "Both. Mostlythefactthatthey're
going to hold the slanted eye against [Mr. Wilske] because he's a drug possessor, so,
therefore, he's probably a drunk driver too." (Tr., Nov. 1, 2013, p.7, Ls.21-24.)
The district court determined that there was really no "concern here that the jury's
going to be faced with the issue of, Gee, did he use the marijuana or not and when did
10

he use it and

it have
"

of that

effect on his ability to drive or be in actual physical control
"the Information specifically alleges that Mr. Wilske was under

the influence of alcohol, it does not allege that he was under the influence of-or any
other intoxicating substance." (Tr., Nov. 1, 2013, p.11, Ls.1-9.) The district court also
determined that trying the counts together would not substantially impair Mr. Wilske's
ability to have a fair trial: "under these particular circumstances and in our culture, I
don't think that this is the type of joined trial that would inflame this jury to the extent that
maybe some other joined charges might." (Tr., Nov. 1, 2013, p.11, L.20 - p.12, L.4.)
However,

the

third

source of prejudice from

Abel actually appeared

during

Mr. Wilske's trial.
Mr. Wilske's motion to sever primarily implicated the third possible sources of
prejudice from Abel. (See Tr., Nov. 1, 2013, p.7, Ls.21-24.) The third source "involves
the potential risk of prejudice. The risk is that the jury may conclude that the defendant
while not guilty of the specific alleged offense is a bad person and will reach a guilty
verdict on that basis." Abel, 104 Idaho at 868. When considering the third source, the
Idaho Supreme Court, like courts in some other jurisdictions, has "engaged in an
analysis of the evidence of the separate counts to determine whether, if the counts had
been tried separately, the separate evidence could have been admitted in evidence in
the different trials."

Id.

This essentially involves an Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b)

analysis. See id. at 869.
Rule 404(b) provides that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident.
11

I.RE. 404(b).
When determining whether evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
admissible, a trial court must first "determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
establish the other crime or wrong as fact." State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009).
'The trial court must also determine whether the fact of another crime or wrong, if
established, would be relevant ... to a material and disputed issue concerning the
crime charged, other than propensity." Id. (internal quotation omitted); see Abel, 104
Idaho at 869. "Such evidence is only relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that
the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor."

Grist, 147 Idaho at 52.

Whether evidence is relevant is a matter of law and subject to free review. Field, 144
Idaho at 569.
The trial court must then "engage in a balancing under I.RE. 403 and determine
whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the
evidence."

Grist, 147 Idaho at 52.

This balancing is committed to the trial court's

discretion. Id.; see Abel, 104 Idaho at 869.
Mr. Wilske asserts that the third source of prejudice appeared during his trial
because evidence of the misdemeanor charges would not have been admissible in a
separate trial of the felony DUI charge, as it was not relevant to the felony DUI. As
Mr. Wilske asserted before the district court (see Tr., Nov. 1, 2013, p.6, L.23 - p.7, L.6),
evidence of the misdemeanor possession and drug paraphernalia charges was
irrelevant to any material and disputed element concerning the most serious charge,
felony DUI, other than propensity.

See I.RE. 404(b); Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52.

Mr. Wilske's counsel warned the district court that the jury would "hold the slanted eye

12

[Mr. Wilske]

a drug

drunk driver too." (Tr., Nov. 1, 2013, p.7,

so, therefore,

probably a

1

Because the evidence of the misdemeanor charges was not relevant to the
felony DUI charge, the evidence of the misdemeanors would not have been admissible
in a separate trial of the felony DUI.

Cf. Abel, 104 Idaho at 869 (holding, in a case

where identity was at issue, that "the evidence of either incident when the totality of the
circumstances is considered would have been admissible in a separate trial of the
others").

Thus, the third potential source of prejudice-the possibility that the jury may

conclude that Mr. Wilske was guilty of one crime and then find him guilty of the other
simply because of his criminal disposition, i.e., Mr. Wilske is a bad person-appeared in
this case.
Mr. Wilske has therefore presented facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice
resulted from a joint trial, and he was denied a fair trial. See Eguilior, 137 Idaho at 908.
The district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Wilske's motion to sever. His
judgment of conviction in the 2013 case should be vacated, the case should be
remanded to the district court, and the misdemeanor charges should be severed from
the felony DUI charge upon remand to proceed in separate trials.

II.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wilske's "Motion For A Partial Directed
Verdict" In The 2013 Case

A.

Introduction
Mr. Wilske asserts that the district court erred when it denied his "motion for a

partial directed verdict" in the 2013 case, because substantial evidence did not support
his conviction for felony DUI under the alternative theories challenged in the motion.
13

The motion for a partial directed verdict requested that the district court remove from the
jury's consideration the alternative theories that Mr. Wilske drove while under the
influence, drove with a BAG greater than 0.08, or was in actual physical control of a
vehicle while under the influence, for lack of evidence.

The district court denied the

motion on the basis that the jury could infer from the evidence presented that Mr. Wilske
committed the crime of felony DUI under each of those theories. However, substantial
evidence did not actually support conviction under those theories.

B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
Appellate courts "will not overturn a judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury

verdict, where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could
have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements
of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 569 (2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The appellate court views "the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution," and does not substitute its judgment "for that of the
jury regarding the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the evidence, and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).

"Evidence is substantial if a reasonable jury could have relied upon it in

determining that the allegation was proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
To establish a DUI offense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
(1) that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol, drugs, any other intoxicating
substances, or any combination of the three, or (2) that the defendant had a blood
alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. See I.C. § 18-8004(1 )(a). Under both theories of
proof, the State must also prove that the defendant drove or was in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle within Idaho upon a highway, street, or bridge, or upon public
14

or

property open to the public. See id. "The

may elect to proceed against

the
112 (2005). Here, the State elected to proceed against Mr. Wilske under both theories
of proof. (See R., p.224.)

C.

Substantial Evidence Did Not Support Mr. Wilske's Conviction For Felony DUI
Under The Alternative Theories Challenged In The "Motion For A Partial
Directed Verdict"
The district court erred when it denied Mr. Wilske's "motion for a partial directed

verdict," because substantial evidence did not support his conviction for felony DUI
under the alternative theories challenged in the motion.
The motion for a partial directed verdict requested that the district court remove
from the jury's consideration the alternative theories that Mr. Wilske drove while under
the influence, drove with a BAC greater than 0.08, or was in actual physical control of a
vehicle while under the influence (see Tr., Nov. 8, 2013, p.406, L.4 - p.407, L.13),
essentially challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for those theories. See State v.
Ashley, 126 Idaho 694, 695-96 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a criminal defendant may
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict even without raising the
issue before the district court, just as a civil appellant may challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence without moving for a directed verdict below).
The district court denied the motion for a partial directed verdict because the jury,
"under the evidence that's before it ... could reasonably infer that [Mr. Wilske] drove
or-and/or was in actual physical control of this motor vehicle while impaired by
alcohol." (Tr., Nov. 8, 2013, p.410, Ls.16-23.) According to the district court, "This jury
could also reasonably infer that he drove this vehicle with a BAG greater than .08
percent depending on what they believe the evidence to be as to when he drank the
15

that are in question." (Tr., Nov. 8, 2013, p.410, L.24
substantial

p.411, L.2.) However,

did not actually support conviction under those theories.

In this case, the following evidence was presented during Mr. Wilske's jury trial:
(1) Deputy Jacobson testified that he encountered Mr. Wilske after he saw
Mr. Wilske's car parked on the side of the road (Tr., p.163, L.6 - p.164, p.17),
(2) The car's engine was running when Deputy Jacobson walked up to the car and
approached Mr. Wilske (Tr., p.164, L.18 - p.165, L.6),
(3) Deputy Jacobson saw that Mr. Wilske was in the driver's seat texting while he
had a beer between his legs (Tr., p.165, Ls.7-10),
(4) Mr. Wi!ske tried to conceal the beer between his legs when he realized Deputy
Jacobson was there, and reported that he spilled it (Tr., p.165, Ls.11-24 ),
(5) When asked, Mr. Wilske told Deputy Jacobson he had consumed only one beer
(Tr., p.167, Ls.1-4),
(6) Deputy Jacobson noticed that Mr. Wilske had the odor of an alcoholic beverage
on his breath, glassy, bloodshot eyes, and slurred speech (Tr., p.167, Ls.11-21 ),
(7) The deputy administered field sobriety tests on Mr. Wilske, and he met six of six
points on the horizontal gaze nystagmus, four of eight points on the walk-andturn, and no points on the one-leg stand (Tr., p.174, L.15- p.177, L.11),
(8) After Deputy Jacobson arrested and Mirandized Mr. Wilske, Mr. Wilske stated he
had consumed only one beer (Tr., p.177, L.15 - p.178, L.18),
(9) Mr. Wilske provided a breath test sample about two hours after the initial stop
(Tr., p.181, Ls.17-21),
(10)

The SAC results were .125 and .132 (Tr., p.188, Ls.5-8),
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(11)

Deputy Jacobson was

FTO certified at the time of the stop (Tr., p.219,

1),
(12)

The recording of the stop did not show that Deputy Jacobson properly

instructed Mr. Wilske to keep his leg straight and his foot parallel to the ground
(See Tr., p.240, L.24
(13)

p.241, L.4),

Mr. Wilske testified that he had consumed about one beer before pulling

off the side of the road (Tr., p.390, Ls.8-18),
( 14)

Mr. Wilske testified that he consumed three beers while he was pulled

over (Tr., p.392, Ls.8-14), and
(15)

Mr. Wilske testified that he drank the rest of the beer that had been

between his legs when Deputy Jacobson went back to the patrol car (Tr., p.394,
Ls.6-10).
Mr. Wilske submits that the above evidence, even when viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, see Parton, 154 Idaho at 569, did not constitute substantial
evidence to support his conviction for felony DUI under the alternative theories that
Mr. Wilske drove while under the influence, drove with a BAG greater than 0.08, or was
in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence. (See Tr., Nov. 8, 2013,
p.406, L.4 - p.407, L.13.) There was no direct evidence that Mr. Wilske actually drove
while under the influence or with a BAG greater than 0.08. Similarly, there was no direct
evidence that he was in actual physical control of the car while under the influence.
Further, Mr. Wilske asserts that the evidence presented to the jury did not allow the jury
to

infer that he had

committed

felony DUI

under any of the

above three

alternative theories, based on his testimony that he drank multiple beers while he was
pulled over. ( See Tr., p.392, Ls.8-14.)
17

Substantial evidence did not support Mr. Wilske's conviction for felony DUI under
the

theories challenged in the motion. Thus, the district court erred when it

denied his motion for a partial directed verdict. Because the verdict form only indicates
that the jury found Mr. Wilske guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol, without indicating whether the jury found him guilty under one of
the alternative theories challenged in the motion (see R., p.334), it is possible that the
jury found Mr. Wilske guilty under a theory not supported by substantial evidence.
Thus, Mr. Wilske's judgment of conviction on the felony DUI charge in the 2013 case
should be vacated, and the case should be remanded for a new trial on the felony DUI
charge solely on the issue of whether the state could prove that Mr. Wilske was in
actual physical control of the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

111.
The District Court Erred When It Found That Mr. Wilske Had Violated His Probation In
The 2010 Case
Mr. Wilske asserts that the district court erred when it found that he had violated
his probation in the 2010 case.
Appellate courts use a two-step analysis when reviewing probation revocation
proceedings: "First, we ask whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation.
If it is determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation, the
second question is what should be the consequences of that violation."
Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009) (citation omitted).

State v.

"For the first step, a district

court's finding of a probation violation will be upheld on appeal if there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the finding." Id.

"This first step involves a wholly

retrospective factual question." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). ''To comply with
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the principles of due

a court may revoke probation only upon evidence that the

probationer has in fact violated the
quotation marks omitted).

or conditions of probation."

Id. (internal

"In the event of conflicting evidence, we will defer to the

district court's determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses."

Id.

"A court's

finding that an alleged violation has been proved will be upheld on appeal if there is
substantial evidence in the record to support the finding." State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho

378, 381 (Ct. App. 1994); see Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105. A probationer's admission to
an alleged probation violation constitutes substantial evidence to support a district
court's finding of a probation violation.

See State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312

(Ct. App. 2000).
Mindful of Chavez, his admissions to violating his probation (R., p.370; see
R., p.319), and the fact that he is currently on supervised probation (see R., pp.404,
408-14 ), Mr. Wilske asserts that the district court erred when it found he had violated his
probation in the 2010 case, because substantial evidence did not support that finding.

See Lafferty, 125 Idaho at 381. The judgment on probation violation in the 2010 case
should be reversed, and the 2010 case should be remanded for further proceedings.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Wilske respectfully requests that this Court

For the above
judgment of conviction in the

his

13 case and remand the case to the district court with

instruction to sever his misdemeanor charges from the felony DUI charge to proceed in
separate trials. Alternatively, Mr. Wilske respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
judgment of conviction on the felony DUI charge in the 2013 case, and remand his case
for a new trial on the felony DUI charge solely on the issue of whether the state could
prove that Mr. Wilske was in actual physical control of the vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol.

Alternatively, Mr. Wilske respectfully requests that this Court

reverse the judgment on probation violation in the 2010 case, and remand the 2010
case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 30 th day of October, 2014.

BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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